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-I 
At seven-thirty-one A.M. on Saturday morning I am awakened by 
a phone call from mom, "Oh honey--it's a beautiful sunny day that 
knew you wouldn't want to sleep through. Now that you are awake 
go outside and breathe the morning air .... No, no, that's ok, I'll 
wait ... you go ahead and do that .. " After I breathe and get mom off 
the phone I reach over and turn on my stereo. As New Age music 
fills the room I remember when my roommate switched the George 
Winston music I fall asleep to with a subliminal weight-loss tape. 
(I lost five pounds that week-~gained it back plus five more the 
next week). I grab my shoes and head toward the door--I don't want 
to be late for skydiving class--but as I am leaving my friend W. 
pulls into the;driveway blocking my car. She jumps out, pulls me 
into her car and drives away, saying "Skydiving is for dangerous 
fools. I am taking you to play bingo instead." 
More than likely you or I would not wake up to a day like this 
one, but the example is meant to illustrate something important. 
Paternalism is a common phenomenon, one we probably encounter more 
often than we realize. Even though we do not always realize them 
as such, thoughts and judgements on paternalism are employed in 
decisions we make in day-to-day situations about how to treat 
people. An investigation of this liberty-limiting principle, then, 
should be of practical interest to everyone, not just philosophers 
interested in theory. I will investigate the sUbject of 
paternalism by looking at a variety of definitions and examples, 
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exploring the autonomy-based antipaternalist positions of Immanuel 
Kant and John stuart Mill, and finally, incorporating the ideas of 
Christine Korsgaard, a neo-Kantian philosopher, on personal 
identity into an argument for a Kantian version of respect for 
autonomy. Finally, I will present some general guidelines for 
paternalistic interference that can be applied practically. 
Definitions and Ideas about Paternalism 
The term "paternalism" carries traces of the idea "father 
knows best." Many aspects of the parent-child relationship 
operate on the presumption that the parent, mother or father, knows 
better than the child what is in the child's best interest. It is 
accepted that parents are authoritarians in their children's lives 
because it is assumed they, as mature individuals with benevolent 
motives, will be better judges of what is in the child's best 
interest than the child herself, who has less developed capacities 
for deliberation and rational choice. Paternalism in general can 
be thought of as an extrapolation of this model of authority to 
other relationships in which one party assumes a "parental" 
position of sorts over another party in the second party's own 
interests' . 
As defined by Gerald Dworkin, paternalism is "the interference 
with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring 
exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or 
values of the person being coerced" (20). 
'from Kleinig.
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-Joel Feinberg makes a number of distinctions between different 
types of paternalism: harm paternalism vs. benefit paternalism, 
and weak vs. strong paternalism. The goal of harm paternalism is 
protection of the object of paternalism from self-inflicted harm, 
where as the goal of benefit paternalism is the benefit of the 
object of paternalism. 
The distinction between weak and strong paternalism Feinberg 
draws is based on the degree of vOluntariness with which an agent 
engages in self-regarding conduct and has obvious similarities to 
John stuart Mill's work. An action is voluntary to the extent that 
it is undertaken by an agent "informed of all relevant facts and 
contingencies, and in the absence of all coercive pressure of 
compulsion" (Feinberg SP48). (Misinformation, impaired judgement 
faculties, obsessive compulsions, immaturity and lack of physical 
control over one's own body all decrease the vOluntariness of an 
agent's conduct.) Interference into another's self-regarding 
actions to determine whether or not an individual is acting 
voluntarily or in cases where an individual is indeed acting non­
voluntarily is weak paternalism, and is generally accepted as 
justified even by antipaternalists because there is a sense in 
which the agent is not making a real choice to accept the risks 
involved in her behavior. (Feinberg does however point out that 
"Even substantially non-voluntary choices deserve protection" when 
they are not particularly dangerous or risky to the agent (SP49). 
strong paternalism justifies limiting A's freedom to X where A's 
actions are primarily voluntary and where 
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concerns/effects/regards only A, on the grounds that it is in A's 
best interest to be limited from X. 
In Paternalistic Intervention Donald VanDeVeer defines a 
paternalistic act generally as one in which person A, with 
altruistic motives, interferes with S in ways "contrary to the 
operative preference or disposition" of S either to prevent harm to 
or promote benefit of S (19). By defining paternalism as 
interference "contrary to the operative preference of S", VanDeVeer 
is not trying to lable 'unwanted' argumentation or disscussion with 
S as paternalism, but is including various "suspect means" of 
"shaping preferences" and "indoctrination" to control others' 
"choices" within his defintion (19). Subliminal advertising 
techniques, particular uses of hypnosis or sleep teaching, and 
brainwashing and propaganda campaigns are "mild" if not common 
examples of interference of this type and may not seem particularly 
threatening. Consider the other side of the spectrum, however: in 
A. L. Huxley's Brave New World people are invasively programmed and 
conditioned beginning almost from their scientific conception, to 
have only certain likes and dislikes, to hold only particular 
ideals and political preferences. 
Some hold that to consider paternalism only as the 
intervention in another's actions is not to give it appropriate 
scope. Buchanan for example, argues that "to focus exclusively on 
interference with liberty of action, (however), is to construe 
paternalism too narrowly ... Paternalism is the interference with a 
person's freedom of action or freedom of information ... ". (Buchanan 
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61-62). Withholding information from an individual because it is 
deemed by others to be harmful to her, or "forcing" particular 
information that others judge to be in her best interest on an 
individual who has chosen not to have the information, and giving 
wrong information to an individual, (ie. lying), because it is in 
"her best interest" are all forms of paternalism according to 
Buchanan. 
Since both benefit paternalism and weak paternalism are 
relatively non-controversial, the former being generally rejected 
as unjustified, and the latter generally being accepted as 
justified, I will not deal such cases at any length here. Instead, 
the focus of my discussion will be the more controversial case of 
strong-harm paternalism, where the agent is at risk of greatly 
harming herself through conduct which is primarily voluntary. 
Paternalism, The Harm Principle, and Legal Moralism 
It is important not to confuse paternalism with other 
liberty limiting principles such as the Harm Principle and Legal 
Moralism. The harm principle justifies restricting one person's 
liberty in order to prevent that person from injuring other 
specific individuals or society in general. This is a relatively 
noncontroversial liberty-limiting principle as most people whole­
heatedly support principles that protect their personal rights and 
liberty form infringement be others, and with a minimum of 
interference, this restriction puts a check on freedom that allows 
the preservation of the maximum amount of freedom for individuals 
6
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consistent with the same freedom for everyone else. Freedom 
without boundary degenerates into no freedom at all. Laws against 
battery, murder, rape, theft, etc. as well as particular traffic 
laws have as their object the protection of individual A from 
individual B and vice versa. 
Legal paternalism, on the other hand, is state action or 
coercion (laws, statutes, court orders and rulings, etc.) with the 
goal of "protecting" individuals from inflicting harm upon them 
selves or consenting to be harmed by others. (In cases of 
illegitimating consent to certain things, "B's agreement must be 
overruled for his own good, which the state presumes to know better 
than he" (Feinberg HTS172) . Laws requiring prescriptions for the 
use of certain drugs, and mandatory education laws are often 
justified paternalistically as are laws against recreational use of 
particular drugs, dueling, prostitution, gambling, polygamy, aiding 
a suicide, and selling one's self into slavery. 
Laws against prostitution and gambling in particular may be 
justified paternalistically, but the motivation behind such 
legislation may also be moralistic (Feinberg HTS172) . 
. . . is one person exploiting the weakness, or foolishness, 
or recklessness of another ... If a weak, foolish, or 
reckless person freely chooses to harm or risk harm to 
himself, that is alright, but that is no reason why 
another should be a part to it, or be permitted to 
benefit himself at the other's expense" (HTS81). 
Legal moralism is also applied in order to "protect" individuals' 
moral sensibilities and perhaps to guide them in "appropriate" 
directions as deemed by society in general. Laws against "harmless 
immoralities: such as consensual sexual practices done in private 
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by adults are examples of prohibitions justified moralistically. 
The distinction between legal paternalism and legal moralism is 
quite sUbtle, but I intend to deal only with paternalism and not 
legal moralism. 
Examples of Paternalism 
Paternalistic behavior is exhibited with regularity in many 
different contexts and situations; government, medicine, and 
personal relations all provide examples of paternalism. 
Some of our laws, as I have already discussed, are primarily 
justified paternalistically; mandatory seat belts or helmets (in 
the case of motorcyclists), required health warnings on cigarette 
advertisements and packaging, pUblic curfews and laws against 
dueling are more examples of legal paternalism. 2 
Paternalism is also common in the field of medicine. 
Because of the nature of the physician-patient relationship, 
"medical expert" to "non-expert", and the solidly held goal of 
physicians to "benefit and not harm" their patients, many medical 
situations reveal paternalistic tendencies on the part of the 
physician. (Problems of truth-telling, treatment decisions, and 
confidentiality etc.) Also, because it is commonly argued that 
2In some cases laws are justified on non-paternalistic grounds 
as well; the state may hold that it has an interest in protecting 
it's citizens from injuring themselves or draining themselves 
financially and guiding them toward their own benefit as with 
mandatory education laws. As I lay comatose with brain damage 
after a motorcycle crash my decision not to wear a helmet no longer 
only affects myself; my insurance company, Medicaid, Medicare, and 
my employer all shoulder some part of the burden resulting from my 
decision to ride a motorcycle and not wear a helmet. If I grow up 
illiterate and uneducated, I may become a burden on tax-supported 
welfare systems because I can not get a job to support myself. 
8 
-illness impairs autonomy, and therefore a patient's ability to make 
certain decisions may be impaired, problems of informed consent, 
refusal of treatment, guardianship, and proxy-decision making, all 
of which involve paternalism, exist in this context. 
Personal relationships may also involve paternalistic 
behaviors; parent-child relations, friend to friend, lover to 
lover, etc. Such relationships are characterized by intimacy and 
interest in each other's affairs and attitudes of benevolence and 
concern are developed between individuals who care about each other 
and want to see each other have "good" lives. Thus an atmosphere 
very conducive to paternalistic impUlses exists in many personal 
relationships; we may see ourselves as "protectors" of her needs 
and wants even when she doesn't protect them herself: "After being 
your best friend for ten years I know you better than you know 
yourself!"; we want him to have proj ects that are beneficial to him 
and we want these projects to succeed: ("I just want what's best 
for you"). 
Divided Intuitions 
The task of remaining consistent while judging when 
paternalism should be considered justified is not an easy one 
because the nature of paternal ism i tsel f (i. e. "benevolent 
coercion/deception") seems inconsistent and our intuitions may 
differ vastly between virtually identical cases depending upon our 
perspective. When we act paternalistically toward someone, we often 
engage in coercion and deception of another person; in the former 
case we take over control of the individual's actions, leaving her 
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with no power over her own conduct, and in the latter case we 
undermine her knowledge of her own affairs-she does not know what 
is going on, so she cannot assent or dissent on matters that are 
purely her own, and this also robs her of control of her own 
person. These actions, lying and using force, are intuitively 
unappealing and seem wrong, but when we add the "good motives" or 
intentions of the paternalism, these actions take on a different 
light: benevolent motives at least intuitively seem right. Actions 
that we might not otherwise approve of seem at least acceptable, if 
not commendable, when they are motivated by "concern" for the good 
of another. 
Our intuitions about paternalism also depend somewhat on our 
perspective of a paternalistic situation. When we are in the role 
of the "intervener" our benevolent impulses toward those we care 
about, or a sense of duty to "benefit and do not harm " seem to 
direct us to "protect" and "aid" other people when we see them as 
needing "help". Thus, we involve ourselves in the actions and 
decisions of others to "protect" them and "help" them choose 
proj ects and make decisions that we think of as being good or 
beneficial to them. When we ourselves are the object of such 
"protection" or "help", however, our intuitions may be entirely 
different; the "good intentions" of others seem overbearing and 
intrusive, or we may see too much outside "help" as smothering our 
freedom to do things for ourselves. (Analogously, think all the 
times you've given unasked for advice to others during times of 
"trouble"; after all, what's a friend for but to help out when 
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things seem to be going badly. Now think of all the "advice" your 
friends (or your mother) press on you when they think your life is 
not going quite right. The value of the "advice" often seems to 
depend on who is the advisor or advisee.) When sorting out our 
ideas and judgements on paternalism, we must try to imagine what it 
would really be like to live with these judgements. To do this, we 
must put ourselves in the place of the victim and imagine 
paternalism from her point of view. 3 
While further examination of the nature of paternalistic 
intervention reveals firm reasons for holding a strong presumption 
in favor of non-interference, the study of specific cases will more 
than likely produce situations in which this presumption will 
contradict our intuitions. This does not mean, however, that the 
presumption is inappropriate; it merely means it is not all-
encompassing, and such a difficulty can lead to, at most, I 
believe, a slight weakening, but not complete disposal, of· the 
presumption. 
Paternalism in a Liberal Society 
I would first like to establish a general presumption against 
interference with autonomy by using ideas some brought up by John 
Rawls in A Theory of Justice, though in something of a backwards 
3This is an exercise in "Rawlsian" deliberative rationality: 
" .. . the rational plan for a person is the one ... that would be 
decided upon as the outcome of careful reflection in which the 
agent reviewed, in light of all the relevant facts, what it would 
be like to carry out these plans and thereby ascertained the course 
of action that would best realize his more fundamental desires" 
(TOJ417) . 
11 
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fashion. If we accept a liberal society, such as the one in 
which we live, as the best kind of society, we must acknowledge a 
strong presumption against paternalistic interference. 
A liberal society is one characterized by an acceptance of 
different ideas and pursuits, including different conceptions of 
the good (life). People in a liberal society are free to 
deliberate, construct, and pursue their own idea of what is good 
(or of what constitutes the good life), constrained only by the 
minimal principles necessary to maintain social order. In other 
words, a liberal society favors using coercion only when necessary 
to make social life possible; S9 in order to maintain itself, such 
a society adopts and enforces basic principles that determine what 
is right or just, but allows its members to determine and pursue 
their own conGeption of what is good as long as this conception 
does not violate the basic principles of right. Within a liberal 
society, then, people have different conceptions of the "good life" 
and can expect these differing conceptions to be respected even 
though they may not be agreed with by others. Even as a pyrophobe 
I should respect my friend's decision to be a fire fighter, and 
even though she finds reading Rawls and Kant boring, she must 
respect my pursuits in philosophical inquiry and enlightenment. 
Along with a personal conception of the good, each individual 
4Rawl s assumes a liberal society as being favored by his 
principles of justice, which he purported would be easily accepted 
by individuals (in the original position). I am working backwards 
assuming that most of my audience already (loosely, at least) 
favors a liberal society and there for should accept my principles 
of non-interference. 
12 
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has a ranking system by which she labels certain elements of this 
good as more important or necessary than others; when decisions 
between two or more goods must be made, she determines what 
elements are worth sacrificing in favor of others and makes her 
choice appropriately. Different elements of good may move up and 
down a person's ranking scale as priorities, life stages, 
opportunities, etc. change. 
For example, a good life to me may include challenging 
pursuits, intellectual exercise, and social contact with 
interesting people. For me as a 22 year old college graduate, the 
elements of this good life may include traveling across Europe 
alone, dating and meeting new people, and few commitments other 
than perhaps graduate school. I may, perhaps, choose at this stage 
to sacrifice intimate relationships with friends and lovers, stable 
employment, and financial security. At age 25 after three years of 
travel, advanced education, and non-committal relationships I may 
decide that a good life for me includes different elements; a full 
and satisfying personal life (family, friends, lovers,), and a 
stable career may now be things that I find are worth the "cost" of 
shouldering the larger amount of responsibility that was before 
unattractive. 
The point is, in a liberal society people are free to 
deliberate and choose what constitutes the good life for them, and 
decide what they are willing to endure or sacrifice to attain this 
good. When we occupy this position of deliberating and making 
choices (called the deliberative standpoint) we regard ourselves as 
13
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having the power to affect things in our lives and to choose 
between alternative paths and desires. Implicit in this control is 
the idea that we are autonomous. (See section on Korsgaard and 
Personal Identity for more on this.) If we do not consider 
ourselves as having autonomy, we do not regard ourselves as the 
causes of our own actions and therefore cannot make any effective 
choices about our conduct at all. From a liberal perspective where 
autonomy is so very important, there must exist a strong 
presumption against interfering with it. Thus, because the society 
we accept as the best society is a liberal one--one which has as a 
corner stone freedom of choice, ,which in turn requires autonomy to 
be effective and meaningful--we must also accept a strong 
presumption against interfering with autonomy, and thus against 
paternalism. 
Mill and Kant: The Value of Autonomy 
I will start by looking at the positions of two well known 
antipaternalists, John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant. Mill and 
Kant start from common ground with the idea of respect for 
autonomy, and indeed the basic line of argument is similar; both 
think of autonomy as extremely valuable and argue against 
paternalistic interference on the grounds that it undermines the 
freedom of rational beings to exercise their autonomy. The 
substance of the two arguments, however, is quite different. Kant 
and Mill value autonomy very differently and as such have different 
ideas as to what "respect for autonomy" should amount to. 
Liberty, according to Mill, is pursuing our own good in our 
14
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own way and is the most important element of human well-being. 
Mill quotes from Wilhelm von Humboldt's The Sphere and Duties of 
Government: " ... the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the 
eternal of immutable dictates of reason, .. is the highest and most 
harmonious development of his powers ... " (55). 
Human powers include "perception, jUdgment, discriminative 
feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference ... "; these 
mental faculties are "exercised only in making a choice" and are 
improved and developed only by being used (Mill 56). In using, and 
thus developing, these faculties, I make and act on choices 
according to my own desires and inclinations and not those of 
others, ie. I act autonomously. 
Autonomy; is valuable to Mill, then, because it is an 
ingredient of the "ultimate" human end. Mill's idea of respect for 
autonomy is treating it as an important element that brings about 
good states of affairs for individuals and society at large: it 
should be protected, encouraged to develop, and maximized. Mill 
supports active measures to protect and increase individuals' 
freedom and it is by taking such measures when necessary (and not 
interfering when it is not) that we show respect for other's 
autonomy. 
Kant values autonomy much differently; autonomy is 
unconditionally valuable, and valuable as an end itself, as a first 
cause and source of value; as such, autonomy can never be used 
merely as a means to some other end. (Thus, any autonomous being 
15
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is a "first cause" and should be treated as such. I will discuss 
this in more detail in the section "Kant's Antipaternalist 
position" . ) 
In order to understand where Kant gets this notion of autonomy 
as unconditionally valuable, we must wade through several levels of 
his theory before we reach autonomy at the center. According to 
Kant, a good will is the only thing that has intrinsic value--is 
"good in itself"--and all rational beings have wills (GMM395). Our 
wills are the causal forces behind our rational choices, and 
because we have wills, we have the capacity for rational choice. 
This capacity is what Kant calls humanity. Humanity itself is 
independently and unconditionally valuable, that is, valuable under 
any and all circumstances, and is the source of value for 
everything el se. 5 Through our humanity we are value-producing 
beings; by rationally choosing things, we make them valuable and 
nothing else has any value independently of being chosen' by 
rational beings. 
As humanity is the source of all value, it must at all times 
5Kant's claim that humanity is unconditionally valuable is not 
principally different from his claim about the unconditional value 
of a good will because humanity fully realized is the good will. 
Because the good will, which is unconditionally valuable, is 
humanity fully realized, humanity fully realized is unconditionally 
valuable. In fact, this vein of "unconditional value" can be 
traced all the way to rational nature itself; humanity, being the 
capacity for making a rational choice, is fully realized only when 
the choice itself is fully rational. The capacity to make fully 
rational choices is the capacity to have a good will. Merely 
having the capacity to make rational choices, "whether or not that 
capacity is realized, is enough to establish a claim on being 
treated as an unconditional end" because with this capacity for 
rational choice comes the capacity to have a good will, and a good 
will is unconditionally valuable (Korsgaard KFH 197). 
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be treated as unconditionally valuable; for, as Korsgaard explains, 
"If you overturn the source of the goodness, neither your end nor 
the action which aims at it can possibly be good ... " (Korsgaard 
KFH197) Thus Kant' s imperative that we at all times treat 
humanity in ourselves and other with utmost respect. Respecting 
another's humanity means respecting her capacity for rational 
choice; this means treating her as an autonomous agent, i . e. 
regarding her as someone who makes her own choices and is a "first 
cause" of her actions. 
Mill's Antipaternalist position 
Because John stuart Mill is perhaps one of the most well known 
proponents of ;utilitarianism, it may seem odd at first that he 
holds a strong antipaternalist position because initially 
utilitarianism does not seem to afford any strong presumptions 
against such interference. (Most arguments against paternalism 
charge that it undermines freedom and autonomy, and since 
utilitarianism does not place fundamental value on autonomy, 
paternalism seems to be of no independent concern to classical 
utilitarian theories.) Onora O'Neill elaborates on this in her 
article Paternalism and partial autonomy: 
utilitarian moral reasoning takes the production of 
welfare or well-being (variously construed) as the 
criterion of right action. Only when respect for 
patients' autonomy (fortuitously) maximizes welfare is it 
morally required. Paternalism is not morally wrong; but 
some acts which attempt to maximize welfare by 
disregarding autonomy will be wrong if in fact non­
paternalistic action (such as showing respect for others 
17 
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or seeking their consent to action undertaken) would have 
maximized welfare. 
Mill, however, holds that the general good of individuals 
and society at large is generally maximized when the personal 
liberty/autonomy of rational individuals in the full "maturity of 
(their) faculties" is respected: 
The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of 
others, with a person's voluntary acts is consideration 
for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that 
what he so chooses is desirable, or at least endurable, 
to him and his good is on the whole best provided for by 
allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it (Mill 
101) . 
Mill's argument against paternalism according to Gerald 
Dworkin is as follows: 
1. Since restraint is an evil, the burden of 
proo£ is on those who propose restraint. 
2. Since the conduct that is being considered 
is purely self-regarding, the normal appeal to 
the protection of the interests of others is 
not available. 
3. Therefore, we have to consider whether 
reasons involving reference to the 
individual's own good, happiness, welfare, or 
interests are sufficient to overcome the 
burden of justification. 
4. Either we cannot advance the interests of 
the individual by compulsion, or the attempt 
to do so involves evil that out-weighs the 
good done. 
5. Hence, the promotion of the individual's 
own interests does not provide a sufficient 
warrant for the use of compulsion (23). 
The distinction used in premise two is one Mill draws between 
self-regarding and other-regarding actions. Under this 
18
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distinction, an action qualifies as self-regarding if it does not 
harm a particular person or violate a particular duty toward 
others. Since the harm principle does not apply in self-regarding 
actions, the only other justification available for interference 
in another's purely self-regarding actions are appeals to the 
person's own good, welfare, interests, etc. and this is patently 
paternalistic. 
The key to Mill's antipaternalist argument is his claim that 
individuals are generally the best judges as to what is in their 
best interest and therefore it generally produces more good 
consequences to let them remain free to make their own decisions in 
self-regarding matters, than to let others, who are not as good 
judges of their best interest, interfere. There are two supporting 
premises for this claim: First, Mill holds that individuals are 
simply in the best position to decide what is good for them when it 
comes to purely self-regarding matters because they know more about 
themselves than anyone else; (This is simply an epistemic fact for 
Mill); secondly, Mill assumes individuals are the parties most 
concerned with their own well-being, so they will generally make 
the best decisions in self-regarding matters. Therefore, it seems 
that "we cannot advance the interests of the individual" by 
interfering with her actions through paternalistic coercion. 
Related to his claim that individuals are generally the 
best jUdges of their own interest, is Mill's claim that when 
society or other individuals interfere in self-regarding matters, 
19
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even with benevolent motives, "odds are (they) interfere wrongly 
and in the wrong place" (81): 
The traditions and customs of other people, are to a 
certain extent, evidence of what their experience has 
taught them... But it is the privilege and proper 
condition of a human being arrived at the maturity of his 
faculties, to use and interpret experience in his on way. 
It is for him to find out what part of recorded 
experience is properly applicable to his own 
circumstances and character (55). 
When others, let's assume they are benevolent others, make 
decisions for me, they are taking it upon themselves to jUdge what 
is "best" for me based on their experience. Their experience, 
however, may be very narrow, or irrelevant to my situation; they 
may have misinterpreted the implications of their past experiences, 
or perhaps their idea of what is in my "interest" is not acceptable 
to me. This is obviously returning to the key idea that no one is 
a better judge of what is good for a rational individual than the 
individual herself. 6 Thus, Mill holds that society is better 
served on the whole (the net consequences are better) when people 
exercise their freedom as much as possible and this means making 
and acting according to their own decisions, and even their own 
mistakes: 
All errors which the individual is likely to commit 
against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil 
of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his 
good (75) 
and thus, "Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to 
~ill does, however, encourage debate, discussion, " ...Advice, 
instruction, (and) persuasion" and allows that the ideas and 
opinions of individuals may be justifiably swayed or changed 
through such avenues (93). 
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live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each other to 
live as seems good to the rest" (On Liberty) . 
Because of this strong presumption that interference 
generally does not serve the general good as much as allowing 
individuals to be free to self-legislate (even though they may make 
"mistakes"), there are very few situations, other than those which 
fall under the harm principle, in which an individual's liberty may 
be interfered with legitimately: Interferences that constitute 
weak paternalism--interferences in situations in which an 
individual's actions are p~imarily non-voluntary--are not 
particularly troubling to Mill. (In such cases the presumption 
against interference is reversed-it is up to the object of the 
interference t9 show why she should be allowed to proceed with her 
course of action.) An individual's liberty may be legitimately 
interfered with long enough to provide pertinent information or 
warnings regarding her intended action that she may not have, 
because without such information, her action is not really 
voluntary. Limited interference is also acceptable in order to 
determine whether or not an individual is acting voluntarily. 7 
If it is determined that an individual is acting voluntarily, 
further interference constitutes strong paternalism and is not 
7Keep in mind that it is because Mill holds that individuals 
tend to be the best jUdges of what is in their own interest that 
interference in self-regarding actions usually has worse 
consequences than non-interference. If individuals are not the 
best judges, as they may not be without all relevant information 
and warnings, the presumption in favor of non-interference may not 
hold. 
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justifiable. 
For example, suppose I know nothing about the problem of 
mixing electrical current and water. I tell my best friend that I 
plan to place my tv on the edge of the bathtub while I take a 
bubble bath because I want to watch the Five o'clock News. My best 
friend would be justified in restricting my actions long enough to 
let me know that by situating an electrical tv in a precarious 
position on a tub full of water I run a great risk of electrocuting 
myself. By doing so my friend in not really interfering with my 
liberty because as Mill says, "liberty consists in doing what one 
desires" (95) and I expressed my desire as wanting to watch tv in 
the bathtub, not electrocute myself. Since my actions have a good 
chance of leading me toward an end I could not have chosen because 
I did not know; anything about (ie. electrocution), my actions are 
not primarily voluntary and allowing me to continue would have 
grave, irreversible consequences. After she informs me of the risk 
of electrocution, however, she is not justified in restricting my 
actions any further if I choose to leave my tv on the tub; this 
would be strong paternalism because my actions would be now be 
primarily voluntary and according to Mill only I have the right to 
jUdge the risks associated with my desires and to decide whether 
they are too great bear. 
Mill, however, also accepts, perhaps even requires, 
interference which constitutes strong paternalism in one case. For 
example, Mill adamantly supports restrictions which prohibit people 
from selling themselves into slavery--even though they may be 
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acting voluntarily in doing so. This endorsement of strong 
paternalism may seem contradictory to the extreme anti­
paternalistic position Mill has created for himself; after all, why 
shouldn't I be free to choose to sell myself as a slave, 
especially to an entirely benevolent, intelligent master who will 
always make the best decisions for me? Mill's answer is this: when 
a person sells herself into slavery, she is abdicating her liberty­
-defeating the "very purpose which is the justification of allowing 
(her) to dispose of (herself)" (101). 
Prohibiting a person from selling herself into slavery is 
justifiable according to Mill because in doing so we are we are 
protecting and respecting her "future liberty" to make decisions 
and choices later and we are securing a greater amount (or wider 
range) of freedom in general. The same type of argument supports 
prohibitions on suicide; selling myself into slavery or killing 
myself are directly destructive to my capacity to make my· own 
choices and decisions. Mill holds that prohibitions on suicide, 
slavery, and other such "destructive" behavior, even though they 
are interfering with my freedom to voluntarily choose to act in a 
certain way in primarily self-regarding matters, protect more 
freedom than they limit, and are thereby justified. 
Kant's Antipaternalist Position 
The key idea to understanding Kant's position on paternalism 
is recognizing each person as having the capacity for autonomy, and 
therefore having the right to self-legislation. According to 
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Kant, because every person has a will, which is an autonomous power 
of causality, each person is herself a "free" or "first" cause and 
must always be treated as such. (In other words, to say one has a 
will, is to say that she has the capacity for rational choice, and 
should thus always be treated as though she is using this capacity 
and using it well.) To call someone a first cause is to say she 
has the power or ability within herself to decide to begin, and in 
fact to actually instigate, a particular chain of causal actions 
and reactions. Because she has the capacity to make (rational) 
choices, she can be the "starter" of chains of actions toward ends 
she has decided upon, or choose to be a part of another chain of 
action leading to another's end. 
Always regarding another as a first cause means adopting a 
"hands off" type of respect: no "active" measures are to be taken 
to "protect" or "maximize" another's autonomy; for by the very act 
of "protecting" it, you are overriding it, because by interfering 
at all, you place yourself in a causal position above the 
individual and thus they are no longer a first cause, but a mediate 
one. We also have perfect duties to others to refrain from 
practicing coercion and deception because such practice makes it 
impossible for me to consent to contribute to an end or action. In 
taking away my opportunity to consent through coercing or deceiving 
me, others are robbing me of my status as a first cause: 
The idea of deciding for yourself whether you will 
contribute to a given end can be represented as a 
decision whether to initiate that causal chain which 
constitutes your contribution. Any action which prevents 
or diverts you from making this initiating decision is 
one that treats you as a mediate rather than a final 
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(first) cause (Korsgaard RTL334) . 
When we engage in coercive or deceptive practices we treat 
someone else's person or reason (respectively) as a mediate cause; 
since they cannot assent to or dissent from contributing to our end 
they cannot share in it or make their end, and really have no 
causal power whatsoever. We are treating them as a mediate cause, 
as a mere means or tool to be used by us toward our end. A tool 
has two characteristics; it is to be used, and does not control 
itself (Korsgaard RTL335). If we return to the idea of paternalism 
as "benevolent coercion, " it becomes clear that what is true of 
coercion is true of paternalism, regardless of my benevolent 
motives. Kant does not stop here, however; he makes it clear that 
we are not even to interfere with someone who we think is 
irrational to "save" or "protect" them from their own faulty 
reasoning. Korsgaard explains: 
We are not only forbidden to use another as a mere means 
to our private purposes ... We are also forbidden to take 
attitudes toward her which involve regarding her as not 
in control of herself, which is to say, not using her 
reason" (Korsgaard RTL 335) . 
What this tells us is that even when an individual makes 
inappropriate, "bad", or even dangerous choices we cannot interfere 
and deprive her of the right to self-legislation even though it 
seems she is doing a poor job of "legislating" to herself. (It is 
like the right to vote in united states elections; all citizens 
have it regardless of whether or not they are good judges of 
25
 
•
 
presidents. Making poor judgments does not disqualify us from 
being judges.) We cannot treat some as less of an autonomous 
agent because she is exercising her autonomy "badlyll or in ways we 
do not agree with: 
We cannot decide someone is insufficiently 
autonomous merely because he makes some 
choices we would not have made in his place. 
But further: we cannot decide someone is not 
autonomous because he is regularly making 
decisions we know are bad in the sense of 
immoral. It is the capacity for autonomy, not 
its actual exercise, which gives a person the 
right to self-government (Korsgaard TAAL 40). 
Thus, Kant's antipaternalist position in review: 
paternalistic interference intq the affairs of autonomous persons 
is immoral because it treats them as mediate cause or mere means 
which is a direct violation of their autonomy. We can not 
manipulate a person's status as an autonomous agent and consider 
her less of one (who could therefore be paternalized) simply 
because we view the decisions she makes as a self-legislator to be 
incorrect or IIbad ll • 
Mill and Kant: A Last Comparison 
Both Mill and Kant hold that strong paternalism is wrong 
because it infringes upon an individual's "right to decide ll . They 
disagree, however, as to why individuals have this right at all, 
and this difference brings up two different problems in their 
positions. For Mill, it is simply a fact that in general people 
are the best judges of what is in their own best interest, and 
therefore they should be the ones to make decisions in self-
regarding matters. The problem here is that if a person is not the 
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best jUdge of what is in her best interest, she may justifiably be 
the object of paternalism. How do we decide whether or not a 
particular person is the "best jUdge"? We must determine whether 
she is rational and if her decisions are good ones. Not only does 
judging other's decisions calls for tricky value judgments (that 
especially as members of a liberal society) we should hesitate to 
make, but the idea of rationality is not black and white; if 
rationality is a matter of degree, how rational must a person be to 
be considered the "best judge" of her own interest? What 
constitutes irrationality? Answering these questions brings up 
many problems concerning arbitrariness and consistency that Kant's 
position avoids. For Kant, it does not matter whether or not an 
individual is the best jUdge of what is in her best interests 
because it is; simply the capacity for autonomy that gives an 
individual the "right to decide", and all beings with a will have 
this capacity, (there is not the problem of determining whether or 
not the person is a "good judge"), thus paternalistic interference 
is prohibited, period. 
Kant's position is much stronger than Mill's; in fact, the 
problem is that it is too strong. There are some cases in which it 
looks like strong paternalism is (or should be) justified that 
Kant's position would hold the opposite. I do, however, believe 
that Kant's notion of respecting persons is generally preferable 
and more appropriate than Mill's, and with the exception of certain 
types of situations, serves as a better guide by which to jUdge 
whether or not paternalism is justified. 
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Accepting a Kantian View of Persons as Autonomous, Value-
Conferring Beings. 
The Kantian idea of respecting persons as first causes 
(autonomous agents) encompasses something of great importance that 
utilitarianism neglects nearly completely: notions of personal 
identity and of our relation to our own projects (i. our goals, 
actions, accomplishments, etc.) that cohere to our deep intuitions 
about our personal identity. B 
Korsgaard's account of personal identity emphasizes the 
importance of agency and authorship; we are who we are because we 
exercise our agency in certain.ways according to various choices 
between desires. (To the extent I exercise authorship and agency, 
I am the person ME--I have a certain will.) Generally speaking, I 
identify myself a person who has the power to be active leader of 
my life, and more specifically, I identify myself as the person I 
am--ME--as such because I have certain traits that are defined by 
my having certain desires and a particular way in which I choose 
between these desires in order to do particular things. I identify 
my SELF as a "thing" in a position "over and above" my desires; a 
position by nature of which my self has access to all of them, can 
del iberate, make choice, and act on the chosen desire. My 
relationship to my actions is essentially "authorial"; I cause 
them, I am responsible for them, and they are mine. Korsgaard 
BIn the section that follows are ideas from or inspired by the 
Kantian theory of personal identity laid out in Korsgaard's article 
"Personal Identity and the unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to 
Parfit." 
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elaborates: 
I believe that when we think about the way in which our 
own lives matter to us personally, we think of ourselves 
in this way. We think of living our lives, and even 
having our experiences as something that we do (PI331). 
This "special" relationship to our actions is what 
utilitarianism disregards: under the utilitarian view we are 
merely bundles of experiences or persons who have things happen to 
them. utilitarian agents are not only responsible for the 
consequences of their action, but also of their inaction. Consider 
this example: I am placed by a band of six stressed-out biology 
majors in a room that is empty, save a chair and a white control 
panel with a red button. It is explained to me that I have five 
minutes to press the button which will release poisonous, deadly 
gas into the locked office of a biology professor who is grading 
finals. (Death will immediately result for the professor.) The 
band of bio-rebels also informs me that if I have not pressed the 
button within five minutes, they will blow up the entire building, 
killing many more people and destroying expensive property. (The 
seven of us, however, will not be injured.) According to 
utilitarianism, if I do not press the button, I will be responsible 
for the bio-rebels blowing up Sherff, because through my inaction, 
"caused" the consequences. In other words, what they do figures 
into my status as a moral being, and my own behavior, of not 
pressing the button, does not. This destroys my idea of myself as 
having a certain relationship to my actions which is very 
important; if I do not consider myself as the author of my actions, 
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my life loses an important kind of value for me. My successes and 
failures matter to me particularly because they are mine; I believe 
that I actively instigated them and that I an responsible for 
making the decisions leading to them. My actions and experiences 
have a special meaning to me; I get embarrassed or hurt when people 
laugh at something I DID because I am responsible for doing it--I 
was controlling or choosing the action . 
. . . we are agents ... we are free ... and we are 
responsible ... view ourselves in these ways 
when we occupy the standpoint of practical 
reason--that is, when we are deciding what to 
do. This follows from the fact that we must 
regard ourselves as the causes--the first 
causes--of the things.that we will. (Korsgaard 
PI330) . 
Where utilitarianism, in the words of Bernard Williams, 
"alienates one from one's moral feelings ll , a Kantian theory 
encompasses our intuitions, and supports them. 9 
Justifing Limited strong Paternalism: 
Maintaining a Kantian Perpsective 
According to a straightforwardly Kantian position, when I act 
paternalistically toward someone I am not allowing them to exercise 
their agency and be "authors" of their actions. I am not granting 
them the freedom of will necessary to be "moral creatures"-- I am 
not respecting their basic tie to humanity, the capacity to 
rationally set and pursue ends their own ends. Having this 
capacity to self-legislate (autonomy) is valuable because it is at 
the foundation of our concept of moral and personal identity. When 
91 am not claiming that I have made this support entirely 
evident here, only that I have demonstrated how Kant's theory 
encompasses our intuitions about personal identity. 
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you act paternalistically toward someone you are not treating them 
as an autonomous agent capable of making certain choices; in short, 
you are undermining something as basic and necessary as their 
identity as the person they are and as deep as the basis of 
morality itself. 
Because we intuitively, at a very deep level, regard ourselves 
as first causes and identify ourselves as "agents ... free .. and 
responsible .. ", I agree that it seems that a moral theory that hold 
autonomy as important at a very deep level is the most appropriate 
and attractive. (As rule, result oriented theories such as Mill's 
hold autonomy only as "derivative concern", where action based 
moral theories such as Kant's hold it as a "basic concern".) I do 
not, however,- believe that such a view has no room for 
paternalistic interference. The most important reason we need to 
accept a Kantian view of why autonomy is so valuable is that'our 
conception of personal identity relies upon it; so what we are 
actually respecting when treat someone as autonomous is their 
conception of themselves as the people they are. I hold that there 
are some situations in which paternalistic interference is not 
particularly detrimental to an individual's conception of personal 
identity, and therefore is justifiable. (This position obviously 
has Kantian undertaones, but is not as strongly antipaternalistic 
as a pure Kantian view.) 
situations where there is an empirically high risk that can be 
eliminated through paternalistic interference, we are justified in 
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doing so. I also think that there are people who should be 
respected as having the capacity to make some decisions and not 
others. These situations are to be thought of as exceptions to a 
straight Kantian position. and when they are not present. we should 
operate according to the general Kantian rule of respect for 
persons. This position is not as strong as Kant's, but is still 
based in the idea a Kantian respect for persons as autonomous 
agents. 
When is Paternalism Justified? 
Partial Autonomy 
According to Onora O'Neill, "Human autonomy is limited and 
precarious in many contexts ... " and human beings are "imperfectly 
autonomous for; a greater part of their lives" (174). In order to 
limit inappropriate paternalism and keep a Kantian antipaternalist 
argument based in respect for autonomy, I believe that we should 
operate from the premise that even at their best, human beings are 
not perfectly autonomous or perfectly rational beings. 
This means that certain people in certain stages of their 
lives and perhaps ceratin situations may be paternalized more than 
others. In fact, each individual has a scope of autonomy that 
includes and disincludes certain choices from being made. 
Children, for example, have limited autonomy, and should not be 
granted the full right of non-interference, but they do have the 
capacity to make certain decisions and should be allowed to do so 
without paternalistic intervention. Other decisions, however, are 
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outside of their scope and rightfully fall to parents and others to 
make. People who are ill also may have limited autonomy, but can 
still make certain decisions as can people who are depressed, 
confused or ignorant. 
Social Insurance Policies 
When I make certain decisions or claims on myself, such as 
ones to quit smoking, to diet, to stop watching tv, I willfully 
pass a law for myself to follow. In following this law and 
"enforcing" it "against" myself, I am acting autonomously, as I 
made the decision and gave th~ law to myself. (I am not acting 
autonomously in following laws I had nothing to do with setting 
up.) Others, however, have no "right" to "enforce" my own laws 
against me. (This would be like the Canadian Royal Mounted Police 
holding occupation in the United States against the wishes of our 
government to enforce our speed limits on highways; even though our 
government set up the law to be followed, and indeed want people to 
respect it, the Canadian Royal Mounted Police have no right to give 
effect to our government's desires.) 
If I do not follow my law, and "enforce" it on myself, ie. I 
keep buying cigarettes or eating hot fudge sundaes, the law really 
has no substance. (Laws do not amount to anything without being 
followed and enforced.) If my law is important to me, however, I 
want it to have substance and be effective, but my will may not be 
not strong enough to enforce the law I gave to myself at all times. 
In such situations, I can take out "social insurance policy" of 
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sorts that protects against my weakness of will. This "insurance" 
amounts to involving another person or group of people in the 
enforcement of my law by asking them to accept my end, say of not 
smoking, as their end also. (This means they adopt my quitting 
smoking as their end--they themselves do not have to quit smoking.) 
If I ask them to be involved, and they agree to be, I have given my 
consent for the law to be enforced against me by these people; I 
have entitled them to use coercion to "force" me to respect my law 
to myself when I do not do so on my own. When others consent to 
help me toward my ends, they are sharing or letting me use their 
"power" to choose and pursue ends. This is not disrespectful to 
their humanity (I am not treating them as a mere means) because 
they consented and in doing so adopted my end as theirs. 
A social ";insurance policy" does not last forever; 1 ike health 
insurance or life insurance it needs to be renewed periodically and 
may be canceled. In order for the "policy" to be effective, 
however, there must limits as when this can be done. When I am in 
the midst of a nicotine fit or experiencing withdraw symptoms I can 
not spontaneously announce that I no longer want others to enforce 
my law of "No Smoking" against me, and neither at such times may 
those who I have enlisted to "help" me enforce the law withdraw 
from our agreement. If at some point, when I am not at the moment 
experiencing the weakness of will I was seeking to protect against 
with an insurance policy, I wish to cancel the policy, I have the 
right to do so. (Those who have consented to hold the policy 
against me may also withdraw their consent under these 
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circumstances.) 
Decreasing Risk (Procedural Paternalism) 
Paternalism is justified in order to minimize the risks involved in 
certain behavior when the individual's freedom to do the action is 
not generally affected. 
While this is strong paternalism, it is "procedural" only; 
what is regulated here is not an individual's freedom to do a risky 
action, only how, or under what conditions the action may be 
carried out. Mandatory helmet laws or seat belt laws, or other 
"safety" requirements are examples of this kind of paternalism. 
This guideline encompasses a strong intuition by allowing us to 
"help" or "protect" those we care about to the greatest extent 
possible while still respecting their autonomous choice, and 
therefore does not seem to have the problems that arise when 
"dangerous" or "risky" actions are not allowed. Also, this type of 
paternalism is no real threat to autonomous decision making and 
does not enforce a "code of values" that supposedly governs what is 
and is not an "acceptable risk" to take. (The paternalism is still 
barred from interfering simply because she does not agree an 
individual's choice to act in a particular way.) 
A certain extent of paternalism is justified where the action 
is empirically risky and not reversible (or the probable outcome of 
the action is not reversible) and the agent's freedom to do the 
action is generally affected. 
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Paternalism to keep and agent from harming herself where the 
action is irreversible is justified in so far as first restricting 
the action for a period of time during which the agent's capacity 
for evaluation -not the evaluation itself- could be looked at. This 
period would serve as well as a cooling off period for the 
individual considering the action so that she may be certain she 
wants to choose this course of action. If the capacity for 
evaluation is found to be impaired, or if the agent is suspected of 
being under the influence of "suspect means of interference" (mind­
altering drugs, hypnotic suggestion, etc.) that is, the action is 
non-voluntary, the agent may be paternalized until the capacity 
recovers. If the capacity is found to be appropriate for making 
the choice, the action would be voluntary, and thus further 
interference would constitute strong paternalism, but further 
interference consistent with procedural paternalism is justifed. 
When the evaluative rationality of an action is in question 
and the action is reversible, interference is not justified beyond 
intelligent argument. 
What is involved is this cases is a value jUdgement and this 
immediately should call for a presumption against paternalism. (See 
the section on Paternalism in a Liberal Society.) Even if the 
agent's scale of value seems absolutely and inherently confused or 
incorrect, the action is reversible so a confused agent can indeed 
change her value scale in reflection after the action is done. 
Intellectual argumentation is always justified, for it only brings 
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new ideas to light or presents old ideas in new light and leaves 
the evaluation up to individuals. 
In similar cases where the action is irreversible but poses no 
specific threat to the agent (threats to the general health, 
disposition, attitude or quality of life of an agent are not 
specific threats) paternalism is not justified beyond 
argumentation. 
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specific Cases of Paternalism 
1. 
In the midst of severe depression T. joins a brainwashing 
cult. Every week she has a brainwashing appointment with a doctor 
in the cult whom she thinks is a psychologist. He brainwashes her 
to blindly follow the cult leader, and while brainwashed she 
doesn't feel depressed. (She does not know she is being 
brainwashed.) Sometimes between sessions the brainwashing wears 
off, and T, returns to her severe depression. She claims in these 
in between times that she enjoys cult life and doesn't feel 
depressed all the time any more. I kidnap T. from the cult and try 
to explain to her that she is being brainwashed. When the 
brainwashing has worn off she believes me, thanks me, and stays 
away from the cult and begins to see a real psychologist to help 
her depression. 
This is a case of weak paternalism. Mill would say I was 
justified because while T. may have made a rational choice to be in 
the cult (It helped her depression, she made new friends, etc.), 
she did not make a voluntary choice to be brainwashed. Kant would 
say that my interference was not justified because I must respect 
T. 's capacity to reason, regardless of whether or not she is 
exercising it. My position is that because T. was the victum of 
"suspect means" of interference, ie. brainwashing, I was justifed 
in intervening on her behalf. 
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What if given the information that she is being brainwashed, 
T. still wishes to return to the cult, claiming she is choosing to 
be brainwashed? This now strong paternalism because T. is acting 
voluntarily. Mill would say I could justifiably prevent her from 
doing so for reasons analogous to those why humans are constrained 
from selling themselves into slavery, ie. she is disposing of the 
very thing, her autonomy, that would require us to respect her 
choice to dispose of it. (Someone can not rationally choose to 
dispose of her rationality.) Kant, on the other hand, I believe 
would say that while T.'s actions are not right, I am not justified 
in interfering. I believe Kant would say that by choosing to be 
brainwashed T. is giving up her capacity for rational choice, and 
in doing so is disposing of herself as a "source of value" (see top 
of page 17), but since Kant's idea of respect for autonomy requires 
that I refrain from coercion, and "protecting" T.' s autonomy 
constitutes coercion, I am not justified in interfering even though 
T. is acting wrongly. 
Now, if T. does not believe me when I tell her she is being 
brainwashed, maybe my evidence is not sufficient for her standards, 
and she wishes to return to the cult, am I justified in 
interfering? (In this case T. is not "choosing" to dispose of her 
autonomy by being brainwashed, she is simply choosing not to 
believe me.) This is strong paternalism. Mill would say that I am 
justifed in interfering if T.'s decison is irrational~ if she is 
simply refusing to accept my claim that she is being brainswashed 
in the face of good evidence, she is not making a rational choice, 
39 
•
 
and according to Mill, she is no longer the "best judge" of her own 
interest, and therefore paternal ism is j usti fed. For Kant, 
however, being the "best judge" makes no difference; I must respect 
T.'s choice even if she is a bad judge of her own interest. In 
this case I agree with Kant. I must assume that T. has reasons to 
disbelieve me--I must assume that she is using her rationality and 
using it well in this case. If I were to interfere and not allow 
her to return to the cult I would be showing immense disrespect for 
her right to decide whether or not to believe me. 
2. 
c. smokes heavily and tells me she wishes to quit for her 
health, but claims she enjoys smoking a lot and that she is too 
addicted to do quit. (Withdrawal symptoms, etc.) I secretly slip 
magic pills into her lunch food that make her no longer crave 
cigarettes: she does not feel any withdrawal symptoms, and the 
pills have no side effects. C. quits smoking. 
This is strong paternalism. Mill would say I was not 
justified. C. is acting voluntarily, and as long as she smokes 
where it only effects her, I can not interfere. (If her smoking 
becomes an "other-regarding" action, then I can justifiably 
interfere under the harm principle.) Kant and I agree again: I was 
absolutely not justified in interfering in C.'s action, because I 
must respect her choice to smoke even though it is bad for health. 
(Kant does hold that we have duties to protect our health, but this 
duty is not categorical and rises out of prudence only.) 
Similarly, I hold that while smoking poses a risk, it is only a 
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general risk to her health. She knows the risks of smoking, and 
understands that it is a weakness of will that keeps her from 
quitting, but has not included me in her end of quitting smoking, 
so I can not give her will the extra "power" it needs to quit. 
2a. 
Now, C. has decided to quit smoking and has stated that in 
order to achieve this goal, she will no longer have in her 
possession cigarettes. "In order to quit smoking I will no longer 
carry cigarettes on my person or have them in my car or house, etc. 
I will not buy, bum, or steal cigarettes", she states. Later that 
day I see C. in Walgreens buyin9 a pack of cigarettes. I run up to 
her, grab them away and refuse to allow her buy them. "I want to 
buy those", she yells. "Do you still want to stop smoking?" I ask. 
"Yes!!" she says. I do not let her buy them, and in fact follow 
her around making sure she does not buy, beg or steal any 
cigarettes. 
This is strong paternalism. Again, Kant and Mill would both 
say I was not justified in interfering. I agree; even though C. 
made her intention public and in so many words admitted to having 
a weak will where smoking is concerned, she still did not assent to 
anyone's "help" (so it is not a "social insurance policy" case) and 
she is still acting voluntarily (so it is strong paternalism.) 
2b. 
C. has asked me to not allow her to possess cigarettes, "No 
matter how much" she protests, because she has decided to quit 
smoking and in order to do so she must not have cigarettes around. 
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I do not let her buy cigarettes even though later in the day she 
insists she has changed her mind and no longer wants to quit 
smoking. 
This was strong paternalism because C's actions in insisting 
she wanted to smoke were primarily voluntary. I hold that I was 
justified in interfering, however, because C. and I "joined forces" 
so to speak; by asking for my help she is giving me the chance to 
decide whether or not to help her, (so she is not using me as a 
mere means), and also by asking for my help, she included me in her 
end and gave consent to have her law of "no smoking" enforced by 
me. 
3. 
My friend J. feels that the effort involved in making complex, 
informed decisions is just too much for her to handle. (She does 
fine with trivial ones like what to wear, what to eat, etc.) When 
she has lot of information she feels paralyzed in analysis' and 
feels powerless to choose. She is so adamant about not wanting to 
be forced to "weigh the serious alternatives" between choices that 
she declares that no one is to provide her with any information 
about alternatives and that she plans to avoid as much information 
as possible, saying "Don't tell me X, I don't want to 
know. It is not in my best interest to know because it is 
detrimental to my well being to make complex decisions." I tell 
her X 
This is a case of benefit paternalism. I was not justified in 
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telling J., It is not up to me to decide what is her best interest; 
because she has the capacity to decide what is in her own good and 
to pursue whatever that may be, I must treat her as if she using 
that capacity even though I do not agree with what she decides. 
If however, X. was information concerning risks involved with 
J.'s conduct, I would be justified in giving her the information. 
This would be a case of strong paternalism because J.'s decision 
not to be given the information was voluntary, but I am justified 
in interfering because J.'s choice to continue the conduct would 
not be voluntary without the information concerning the risk. 
4. 
K is mildly but permanently ill. (Chronic fatigue, or mild 
flashes of pain-something uncomfortable but not totally 
debilitating.) The doctor says K. will live a long life, but there 
are many things she will not be able to enjoy because of her 
illness. (Her quality of life will be affected.) The doctor has 
also said that there is a possibility the illness will clear up on 
its own over time, but that a few doses of a light medication with 
no side effects will clear it up immediately and permanently. K. 
is opposed to taking medication and refuses treatment, saying she 
would rather "wait it out". I secretly slip the doses in her 
food. K. feels better, but assumes it is because the illness has 
cleared up on its own. 
This is a case of strong-benefit paternalism in which I was 
not justified in interfering. K. was informed of the risks of not 
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taking the medication and of the positive effects it would have on 
her. I may think her choice is irrational, but that does not give 
me the right to interfere; it is her decision based on what she 
takes to be good reasons. I must trust that she is using her 
rational capacity and doing so well. 
4a. 
Same case, except K.'s illness is rapidly fatal, though not 
painful. (One dose of medicine will still cure it.) 
This is now a case of strong-harm paternalism. K.'s actions 
of not taking the medicine is primarily voluntary and by 
interfering I am preventing her from harming herself by not taking 
it. I am justified in interfering here as in cases of procedural 
paternalism; interference would not be justified to "force" K. to 
change her stance on taking medication in general, but the risks 
she incurs when she acts on her position can be minimized. (This 
case should be especially clear, because there is no jUdgement 
being made about the quality of life; it is either life or death 
period.) 
5. 
JB loves bubble baths, and also loves to watch the news and 
her favorite sitcoms. In order to do both at the same time, JB 
places the tv on the side of the bath tub, running a great risk of 
electrocution. Thanks to her friend in the example in the section 
"Mill's Antipaternalist Position" she is aware of the risk, but 
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still chooses to continue watching from the tUb, with the tv 
sitting on the side of the tub. Her friend tells her roommate to 
make sure that when JB takes a bath the tv is sitting on the 
counter across the room from the tUb, and not on the tub itself. 
The next time JB takes a bubble bath, her roommate barges into the 
bathroom and moves the tv to the counter. 
This is strong paternalism, but it is justified because the 
victim is not prevented entirely from doing the action, she can 
still bathe and watch tv, but the risk is greatly reduced. 
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Summary Remarks 
•
 
The antipaternalist positions of both Mill and Kant turn of 
the notion of repsect for autonomy. As I have discussed, Kant and 
Mill have different reasons for valuing autonomy, and therefore 
their ideas as to what constitutes "respect" are different. I 
argued that we should accept a Kantian notion of respect for 
autonomy over a Mill's because a Kantian view incorporates and 
preserves our deepest intuitions on personal identity. However, I 
think a straight Kantian view is to strongly antipaternalistic and 
I have therefore assumed a "quasi-Kantian" position. I have 
attemped to maintain a notion of respect for autonomy with Kantian 
undertones to preserve our concpetion of personal identity, while 
at the same time allowing limited strong paternalism. 
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